The 1871 U.S.-Korea Conflict: Cause and Effects

Thomas Duvernay

Preface

The 1871 United States-Korea conflict is one of the least known and understood actions in both Korea and the United States. At the same time, it was a pivotal event in not only the histories of the United States and Korea, but arguably in the world. The failed diplomacy that led to the “Weekend War” set Korea up for a fall just a few short years later, which forever changed the direction of life in Korea, Asia, and the rest of the world, as Japan gained a foothold on the Asian continent. Korea, the xenophobic society, was forced into international relations, which ultimately led to its colonization, then division. Asia saw the rise of Imperial Japan after that point, and then the world was led into a global war. In this paper, I would like to show a few of the main events in the years leading up to the 1871 conflict and how they impacted upon it, including the opening of Japan, the European/American “disturbances” in 1866 and also initial United States military contact in the years between 1866 and 1871. Also, I would like to introduce some of the main participants, on both sides of the issue. Even though there were a couple thousand people involved, there were certain names that appear time after time, especially on the American side. As the paper’s core is related to the military conflict between the United States and Korea in 1871, I will go over the course of events before, during and after the fighting. I have often thought about how history might have changed if the meeting in 1871 had concluded amicably, instead of in bloodshed; I will give a short supposition of how history might have changed, if that had been the case.

I became interested in the 1871 action, known by the Koreans as the Shinmiyangyo (신미양요: 辛未洋擾), literally Western Disturbance in the Shinmi (1871) Year [Eckert, et al (Korea Old and New: A History 1990, 195) termed it the “American Disturbance of 1871”]. quite by accident. I have had a great interest in Korean traditional archery since 1993 and, after getting involved with it, I started research into its history. I was trying to find the last military use of the bow in Korea. I had heard about the 1871 action, so I guessed the bow must have been used then. No matter how much I searched, I could find no evidence to support my theory. I found it exceedingly strange, as the bow was a military weapon in Korea until the 1890s, when it was finally removed from military tests. Still, there was no mention of its use in either the United States’ or Korean records. What I did find, however, was a very fascinating and compelling story about a country just getting back on its feet militarily, after a devastating fratricidal war, and flexing its new-found muscle on a small secluded country half a world away. Being an American citizen, I partly saw the conflict through that cultural viewpoint. However, having lived in Korea for many years, I also looked at it through Korean eyes. What became clear to me was that through misunderstandings, the United States and Korea encountered each other in a most unfriendly way. Even though the two sides had met briefly before, this was a first impression for both, militarily.

History

Since American expansion to the Far East truly started with Commodore Matthew Perry’s expedition to Japan in 1853, under the Manifest Destiny policy, that would be a good place to start. Perry’s gunboat diplomacy proved very effective in opening up Japan to the West, as Western arms were far superior to those of the Japanese. However, it is likely that Japan was ready to be opened up, albeit reluctantly. One young officer under Perry at that time was Lieutenant John Rodgers, who would one day become a rear-admiral and command the United States Asiatic Squadron and the controversial 1871 U.S.-Korea Campaign (Shinmiyangyo). Rodgers most likely fancied himself being the one who opened Korea, just like his predecessor Perry did with Japan. The things he did not realize were that Korea was different from Japan, and 1871 was a bad year to try anything with Korea, as that country had had previously bad experiences with Westerners.

People commonly associate the actions in 1871 with the intrusion in August 1866 by the American-owned ship General Sherman. Indeed, the Sherman Incident (셔먼호 사건), as the Koreans call it, was used as a pretext by the United States government to intrude into Korea, but it was not that important a factor to them, as it was privately known by officials that the Sherman was little more than a piratical vessel (Shufeldt Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1867; Febiger Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1868; Y.K. Kim The Five Years’ Crisis, 1866-1871 2001, 77; Lee, Y.B., et al. Korean-American Relations, 1866-1997 1999, 38), with few Westerners aboard; most of the crew was Asian (W.M. Kim Contemporary Korean-American Relations History 1992, 168; Y.K. Kim 2001, 61). The actions in 1871 are referred to as being punitive by the United States forces. They are talking about their being in retaliation for the Koreans opening fire on the ships in June 1871, not for the General Sherman incident in 1866; this is often confused by historians. Still, from all reports at that time, the United States government did try to ascertain the fate of the General Sherman’s crew, and to gain the release of any survivors. Here are excerpts from an account from 1867 as an example of what the United States knew about the General Sherman:

The people here(Ta-tong) all say that the crew of the General Sherman were all murdered by the people on the river, and not by order of the mandarins.

The Coreans report that the Chinese descend upon this coast in junks and rob the inhabitants. Last year six young men were killed by these plunderers on the island of Neu-to, opposite our present anchorage.

The head men of two villages have stated that the General Sherman was burned in the Ping-Yang river in the month of September last, and the officers and crew, consisting of twenty-seven persons, were murdered by the people, and not by order of the mandarins. This fact, they state, is known all through Corea.

The Coreans say that ten of the crew of the Sherman were Canton Chinamen, and that these people have been in the habit, for years, of coming to this coast to rob and plunder, to the great dread of the whole seaboard. This is confirmed by our pilot.

Mr. Hogarth, an English subject on board of the Sherman, was known throughout China for his reckless character; and his acquaintances suppose that if riot occurred, he would be very likely to be one of the means of causing it. (Schufeldt 1867).

As can be seen, the Koreans allude to the fact that most of the Sherman’s crew was Asian and that they had had problems with them in the past. Also, that one person aboard the Sherman (Hogarth) was especially known in the region for his trouble-making.

The year 1866 was a busy one for the government of Korea. The General Sherman caused it one headache, while the French were causing it another. In the spring of 1866, nine French missionaries were executed by the Korean government, as foreign influence, especially religious, was being repressed and any followers were being persecuted. In October 1866, the French invaded Kanghwa Island, in retaliation for the executions, with about 500-1,000 troops. The Koreans call this the Pyǒnginyangyo (병인양요: 丙寅洋擾), or the Western Disturbance in the Pyǒngin (1866) Year [Eckert, et al termed it the “French Disturbance of 1866”]. They also had battles with Korean forces as far up as the Munsu Mountain Fortress (문수산성). However, by early November, the French started experiencing heavy casualties in fighting near the southern part of Kanghwa Island. By the third week of November, the French forces left Korea. They took with them many war prizes, including 340 volumes from Korea’s archives on Kanghwa Island. In the past decade, Korea and France have discussed the return of the books, but none have come back so far. In a personal note, about three years ago I came into possession of a Korean horn bow that was captured by the French in 1866. The person I received it from wished for it to be returned to Korea, so I brought it with me. I turned it over to the Korea Military Academy Museum, where it is now housed. As far as I can ascertain, it is the only war prize ever formally returned to Korea.

If those intrusions were not enough, the Koreans were to have one more that year. Ernst J. Oppert, who was originally from Germany, was contacted by a French priest, Father S. Féron, who had escaped execution by the Koreans that spring. Féron gave Oppert the idea of exhuming and holding for ransom the corpse of Namyǒn Kun, the father of the Tae Wǒn Kun, the regent of Korea (the Tae Wǒn Kun, Yi Ha- ǔng was the father of King Kojong). The misadventure was supposedly financed by an American, Frederick Jenkins, an interpreter at the United States Consulate General in Shanghai. About 120-plus men took part in the scheme, with most being Chinese and Filipino. They made their way to the tomb, located in Tǒksan County, in Ch’ungchǒnnamdo and proceeded to dig it up. They got as far as the coffin, but didn’t realize how complete and complicated Korean burials could be. The noise and commotion they created got the attention of the local population who chased them away. They escaped to Yǒngjong Island but were also opposed by locals there. Again, they fled. Oppert made it back to Germany and later wrote a book about his failed mission (A Forbidden Land: Voyages to Corea 1880). Jenkins was put on trial by a United States court, but was acquitted (Y.K. Kim 2001).

It is easy to see why the Koreans, by 1871, were not all that eager to enter into discourse with the Americans or any other foreigners. In fact, it just reaffirmed the Tae Wǒn Kun’s resolve to exclude foreign contact, which reinforced the meaning of Korea’s nickname of The Hermit Kingdom.

From the unfortunate meetings of Westerners and Koreans in 1866, to the confrontation between the Americans and Koreans in 1871, there was sporadic contact. Most of the contact was with American warships, which came to the waters of Korea to try and ascertain the fate of the crew of the General Sherman. Each of those times, the Americans were given little information and were simply asked to leave Korean waters and go home. Here is the exchange between Commander Schufeldt and a Korean official (type and spelling are copied from the original text):

Memorandum of an interview between Commander R. W. Schufeldt, of the

United States steamer Wachusett, and a Corean official from the district

city of Hae-Chow-Poo, on the Tai-tong river.

At Neu-to ISLAND,

January 29, 1867.

Commander Shufeldt. Where are you from and on what business have you

come?

Corean official. My name is Le-Ke-Yung; I reside in the district of

Hae-Chow, at Kee-Chen (village;) where I am the ruler; I have come to see

your ship.

Commander Shufeldt. This vessel came here January 24th. and sent a letter

by the people of Neu-to island to the officer of Chang-Yuen-Heen,

accompanied with a communication to the King from which no answer has yet

been received. Do you know anything about this?

Corean. I know nothing about it whatever. On what business have you

come?

Commander Shufeldt. An American vessel was wrecked in the Ping-Yang

river in the month of September, and it is reported that this vessel was

burned and all on board put to death by the Coreans. I have come to

investigate this matter and have sent a despatch to the King to inquire

whether the report is true of false, and whether any of the people are

still living.

Corean. How many li is it to your country? As it does not become your

excellency to remain long at this place, I earnestly hope you will depart

speedily and return to your own country.

Commander Shufeldt. The ship is merely a waiting an answer to the

despatch.

Corean. You ought not to delay, but leave at once.

Commander Shufeldt. Have you heard or do you know anything about the

ship that was wrecked?

Corean. I know nothing about it whatever. I only hope you will

immediately leave and return to your native country.

Commander Shufeldt. I an auxious to depart speedily, but I wish first to

ascertain the truth about the ship wrecked in the Ping-Yang river. No

answer has yet been received.

Corean. I do not know whether this report is true or false. Do not

delay; but leave at once; by so doing your honorable country will have

great praise.

Commander Shufeldt. What objection can there be to our waiting? If I am

obliged to leave without an answer to my despatch, many more armed vessels

will return to your country.

Corean. To return with many armed vessels would be exceedingly unjust To

return to your own country would be praiseworthy.

Commander Shufeldt. To allow your country to murder our men without

cause or provocation cannot be passed over uninvestigated.

Corean. I do not know anything about this business.

Commander Shufeldt. If you know nothing, I have nothing more to say to

you.

It is interesting to note that Commander Schufeldt (also spelled Shufeldt; different historical sources, including official United States government records, have some discrepancies) never got the answers to his questions in 1867 yet, in 1882, was the key United States representative when the treaty between that country and Korea was signed. Coincidentally, 1882 was also the year that Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, who commanded the Asiatic Squadron in 1871, died.

Main Participants in 1871

Most of the main people involved on the United States side in the 1871 action are well-known through United States historical records. Let us first start with the political figures that first conceived of the expedition. That takes us to Washington, D.C., where the initial plan to approach Korea was drawn up.

The first person is Hamilton Fish, the Secretary of State in the Ulysses S. Grant administration. There were two Sewards who were instrumental in the action: William H. Seward, former Secretary of State and his nephew George F. Seward, United States Consul-General in Shanghai, China. Frederick Low was appointed United States Minister Plenipotentiary to China, and was also given diplomatic and political control of negotiations with Korea. Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, who would lead the expedition, was in Washington, D.C. to meet and discuss the matter with the politicians and diplomats. Also in attendance was the Assistant Secretary of State, J.V.B. Davis. Not in attendance at the meeting, but an important person, was Secretary of the Navy, George M. Robeson. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss objectives of the mission to Korea. At the conference, “Seward is on record as having proposed that a treaty protecting shipwrecks should be procured since an insistence on a commercial treaty would likely result in hostilities” (Y.K. Kim 2001). At least on its face, the United States seemed as though it wanted to avoid hostilities.

On the military side, the United States has many names that are well-known from the 1871 action. Aside from Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, several officers (United States Navy, unless noted) were of special note:

l Blake, Homer C., Commander: USS Alaska

l Casey, Silas, Lieutenant Commander: Commanded the infantry in the ground assault on the fortresses.

l Cassel, Douglas P., Lieutenant Commander: Commanded the artillery in the ground assault.

l Kimberly, Lewis A., Commander: Commanded the combined landing forces.

l McCrea, Edward P., Commander: USS Monocacy

l McIlvaine, Bloomfield, Lieutenant: Best friend of Lieutenant Hugh McKee.

l McKee, Hugh Wilson, Lieutenant: One of three United States personnel to die in battle, June 11, 1871.

l Mead, William W., Lieutenant: Left battery of artillery.

l Rockwell, Charles H., Lieutenant: USS Palos

l Schley, Winfield Scott, Lieutenant Commander: Adjutant General of landing forces.

l Tilton, McLane, USMC Captain: Company I and commander of Marines.

l Totten, George M., Lieutenant: Company C

l Wheeler, William K., Lieutenant Commander: Commanding left wing.

Another person of note:

l Felice Beato: Famed photographer. He accompanied the Americans on their expedition and took photos before and after the fighting.

The Korean forces are not as well represented, as the identities of most all those involved are unknown. However, there are a few notable Koreans.

l Ŏ Chae-yǒn (어재연: 漁在淵)Commander of Korean forces on Kanghwa Island; killed fighting American forces, June 11, 1871.

l Ŏ Chae-sun (어재순: 漁在淳)Younger brother of Ŏ Chae-yǒn; killed fighting American forces, June 11, 1871.

Other involved Koreans of note:

l Pak Kyu-su (박규수: 朴珪壽) Scholar of Pukhak (Northern Learning), who was involved in not only the 1871 action, but also the 1866 intrusion by the General Sherman. He was the author of much of the correspondence with the Americans.

l Chǒng Ki-wǒn (정기원: 鄭岐源) Prefect of Kanghwa Island.

Course of Events

The 1871 action, although a relatively unknown event, has been written about several times over the years, both fictitiously (Werstein The Trespassers 1969) and also factually in many periodicals. In every account I have read, the bulk of the information came from one source, The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy (1871). Because of that, most every account also varies little, although the viewpoint might be slightly different, depending upon what the author was trying to highlight. As the Korean side did not record the events like the American side did, most all accounts tend to be a bit biased towards the American viewpoint. I intend to present not only the American record, but also I will approach certain aspects from the Korean perspective, whenever possible. Also, as I have visited Kanghwa Island many times over the years and have researched the battle areas in detail, along with having cultivated friendships with officials from the Kanghwa County Office, I will interject my own understanding of what happened in June 1871.

The political reasons for the expedition, as we have seen, started in Washington, D.C. some time earlier. The United States already had diplomatic and trade relations with both Japan and China; Korea was a missing puzzle piece. For years, countries tried to pry open the society with little luck; Korea was probably little more than a trophy to be won, although it did—and does—have a very strategic position between Japan and China. I am not overly concerned with the motives for the United States’ action in Korea, but instead I will discuss the action itself, along with its subsequent ramifications.

As I mentioned above, it had been only six years since the United States ended its bloody civil war. It was now looking to flex its new-found unified military muscle. However, in comparison to other navies of the world, the United States was lagging behind (Canney The Old Steam Navy: Frigates, Sloops, and Gunboats, 1815-1885 1990, 145). While its ships had steam-powered screws, most were still wooden vessels that were aging and did not offer much armor defense. In contrast, European navies started to employ iron dreadnoughts. Also, as coaling stations were few and far between, the Asiatic Squadron relied mostly on sail. In the case of its involvement in Korea though, it was more than a match for Korean forces with their centuries-old military technology.

The United States Asiatic Squadron’s contingent that headed for Korea consisted of five warships: USS Colorado (flagship), USS Alaska, USS Benicia, USS Monocacy, and USS Palos. The first three ships were large sailing vessels, while the last two were side-wheel gunboats. Only the two gunboats had a draught sufficiently low enough to navigate up the Kanghwa Straits (also known as the Rivière Salée [French] and Yǒmha/염하 [Korean]—both terms mean “Salt River”). The original armament on the ships was as follows:

l USS Colorado: (2) 10-inch, (28) 9-inch, (14) 8-inch guns

l USS Alaska: (1) 60-pdr., (1) 11-inch, (10) 9-inch guns

l USS Benicia: (1) 60-pdr., (1) 11-inch, (10) 9-inch guns

l USS Monocacy: (2) 60-pdr., (4) 8-inch guns

l USS Palos: (4) 24-pdr. howitzers, (2) 24-pdr. rifled howitzers (Canney 1990; ARSN 1871).

Along with those ships were several launches, cutters and whale-boats, which were used to ferry troops and supplies to shore and back.

The fleet left Nagasaki, Japan on May 16 and headed for Korea. It arrived in an area called “Roze Roads,” the United States forces named in honor of the French admiral who was in command of the failed French invasion in 1866, on May 23. That area is in the vicinity of what is known by Koreans as Asan Bay (아산만). The Palos was sent to scout an anchorage for the fleet on May 24, at what the French called Isle Boisée, which literally means “Woody Island,” due to the dense growth of trees there. The Americans kept the French name for their use, although they slightly anglicized it as Boisée Island. The modern Korean name is Chakyakdo (Peony Island, due to its shape); it is located a short distance from Inchǒn, next to Yǒngjongdo.

The Koreans who lived in the area of Roze Roads were curious as to whom the Americans were and why they were there. A paper, written in Chinese, was handed to an officer and was translated. The fleet had no native Koreans to translate for them; however, Minister Low’s secretary, Edward B. Drew, could speak, read and write Chinese, so translating the letter was not a problem. Along with Mr. Drew were two Chinese scribes. As written communication in Korea during the Late Chosǒn Dynasty was still conducted in Chinese, exchanging messages with the Koreans was not nearly as difficult as it could have been. Still, being able to communicate linguistically and culturally are two completely different tasks.

The fleet got under way on May 30, heading for the new anchorage. However, as they were met with a thick fog, they had to anchor south of their destination for the night. The next day, they made their way to the anchorage point and were soon greeted by a Korean junk. The crew of the junk just delivered a dispatch, telling the Americans that three Korean government envoys would be visiting them soon. The next day, May 31, the envoys arrived. According to the official American reports, they were of the third rank (삼품관), so Minister Low would not meet with them, saying he would only meet with officials of the first rank. Here is an interesting thing I found:

In Felice Beato's pictures, KWG-8 was captioned as "Corean
officials on an interview on board the USS Colorado." While they
may have indeed been officials aboard the USS Colorado, they were
assumed to be the three officials who met with U.S. officials the
day before the first shots of the Shinmiyangyo were fired. This is
not the case. I uncovered the log entry for the USS
Colorado for that day and the officials' descriptions were quite
clearly given:

The 3 Corean officials who visited the ship came in a junk from the
direction of the terminus of the road to Seoul. They had another
junk and sampan in company and were attended by about 20 other
Coreans of inferior rank. They represented themselves as attaches
to the foreign office at Seoul and claimed to have been sent by the
King of Corea. They were received at the gangway by the officer of
the deck, Lieut. Cmdr. Wheeler and Mr. Cowles acting Secretary of
Legation and conducted by the latter to the Admiral's office where
their communication was received and read by Messr. Cowles & Drew
acting secretaries of legation, and the two Chinese interpreters.
Two of the officials were of the third order distinguished by their
dress of dark blue gauze and the number of blue jade stone buttons
worn behind the ears, as attachments for the hat and the third was
of the fifth order having a dress of light blue or lavender and a
less number of buttons. Their rank was also indicated by the color
of the umbrellas carried by their retainers & by the difference in
the quality of the bamboo hats peculiar to the country.
H.W. McKee
Lieut."
[from the U.S.S. Colorado's ship's log, May 31, 1871, 8 p.m. to
midnight watch—written verbatim]

As is noted, the officials wore blue dress, while the ones pictured